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ABSTRACT
Sripada and Konrath (forthcoming) use Structural Equation Modeling techniques to provide 
empirical evidence for the claim that implicit and automatic inferences about people’s
dispositions, and not normative judgments, are the driving cause behind the pattern of folk 
judgments of intentional action in Knobe’s (2003a) chairman case. However, I will argue that 
their evidence is not as strong as they claim due to the potential of methodological and statistical 
problems with the way they tested their model. After correcting for these problems, I show that 
even after accounting for the role of dispositional inferences, normative judgments are still 
playing a significant role in folk judgments of intentional action.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Two children, Elijah and Sacha, are playing on a playground when Elijah runs into 
Sacha, knocking her down and causing minor injury. The caregivers rush over to tend to Sacha. 
After assessing the degree of the injury, the caregivers find themselves faced with the task of 
trying to determine the wrongness of Elijah’s act, and also trying to determine what sort of 
punishment (if any) would be appropriate. There are many facts about Elijah, Sacha, and the 
situation that the caregivers may consider when trying to assess the wrongness of Sacha’s action 
and what kind of punishment (if any) would be appropriate. One of these considerations—
perhaps one that would figure prominently in these assessments—would be whether or not Elijah 
intentionally knocked down Sacha. If Elijah was deemed to have intentionally knocked down 
Sacha, the act may be considered more wrong (and it may deemed that a harsher punishment is 
appropriate) than if the act was deemed to have been unintentional. 
What this simple story illustrates is that judgments of intentional action—that is 
judgments related to answering questions like “Did person y intentionally do x?”—are important 
for making normative judgments. Here I mean to use the term ‘normative judgments’ fairly 
broadly to include judgments about wrongness, responsibility, and punishment, along with 
valuation judgments like judgments concerning goodness or badness. In the context of various 
theories that I will be discussing later, I take it that judgments of norm violations—that is 
judgments concerning when people act in a way that is contrary to the way we expect people 
should act—are of primary importance. However, given the dialect to which this thesis belongs, 
the primary concern is the role of normative judgments (like the ones listed above); the primary 
concern is not which of these normative judgments types are of primary importance.
2This inference from judgments of intentional action to normative judgments like 
wrongness of act or appropriateness of punishment seems to be a natural and appropriate order of 
inference. However, what about the reverse interest—that is, from normative judgments like 
wrongness of act or appropriately of punishment to judgments of intentional action? For 
example, what if the caregivers first made a judgment based on a valuation of the badness of 
Sacha’s injury, then used these judgments to inform their judgments of intentional action. Say, if 
Sacha broke her arm, then the caregivers would conclude that Elijah intentionally knocked down 
Sacha, but if Sacha only received a scratch, then the caregivers would conclude that Elijah did 
not intentionally knock down Sacha. This sort of inference should seem really peculiar, and if we 
witnessed the caregivers reasoning in this way, we would be liable to say that the caregivers’
reasoning was in gross error.
However, a growing number of philosophers and psychologists have recently put forth 
views that argue that we often do make inferences from normative judgments to judgments of 
intentional action (Alicke, 2008; Knobe, 2003a, 2006, 2010; Mele, 2006; Nadelhoffer, 2004a, 
2006; Nado, 2008; Uttich & Lombrozo 2010; Wright & Bengson, 2007). 
Before continuing, it will be helpful to introduce some terminology and some 
distinctions. I will use the term unidirectional account to refer to those accounts that assume that 
there is a unidirectional relationship between intentional action judgments and normative 
judgments. This unidirectional assumption comes in two forms: descriptive unidirectionality and 
normative unidirectionality. Descriptive unidirectionality holds that, under normal conditions, 
people do in fact use intentional action judgments as inputs into normative judgments but do not 
use normative judgments as inputs into intentional action judgments. Normative unidirectionality
holds that normative judgments cannot appropriately act as inputs into intentional action 
3judgments. If, in some given case normative judgments did influence intentional action 
judgments, then this influence would be an error. These two components can come apart, as one 
can easily hold normative unidirectionalism while admitting that descriptive unidirectionalism is 
often violated. 
I will use the term bidirectional account to refer to those accounts that assume there is a 
bidirectional relationship between intentional action judgments and normative judgments—that 
is, to refer to those accounts that hold that normative judgments can, and often do, act as inputs 
into intentional action judgments. For most proponents of bidirectionality, this bidirectionality 
claim is primarily a descriptive claim that can be seen as a rejection of the descriptive component 
of unidirectionalism, at least across certain cases (Alicke, 2008; Mele, 2006; Nadelhoffer, 2004a, 
2006; Nado, 2008; Wright and Bengson, 2007). Most of these researchers tend to be either 
agnostic about normative unidirectionalism or accept normative unidirectionalism, explicitly 
stating that descriptive bidirectionalism occurs due to some kind of bias or error. However, 
Joshua Knobe has extensively argued that the bidirectional relationship between normative 
judgments and many folk psychological judgments are reflective of underlying competencies, 
not caused by bias or error (Knobe, 2006; Knobe 2010). This claim by Knobe can be seen as a 
rejection of the normative component of unidirectionalism.
These unidirectional and bidirectional accounts are about the relationships between 
normative judgments and judgments of intentional action. These accounts attempt to answer the 
question: When people make judgments of intentional action, are they using (should they be 
using) normative judgments as inputs into their judgment of intentional action? This question is a 
very different from the question: When people make judgments concerning whether or not 
something is the appropriate sort of thing to which intentional action can be attributed, are they 
4using (should they be using) normative judgments as inputs into their judgments of agenthood. 
The sorts of unidirectionalists and bidirectionalists account being discussed in this thesis are 
concerned with the former question not the latter. In other words, neither the unidirectional nor 
the bidirectional accounts discussed in this thesis make any claims concerning whether or not 
there are (or should be) normative constraints on agenthood (or on judgments concerning 
agenthood). 
The debate between unidirectionalists and bidirectionalists has potential implications for 
several debates within philosophy, the law, and other domains. For example, many philosophical 
accounts of intentional action explicitly view conservatism as being a virtue of theorizing about 
the philosophically relevant concept ‘intentional action’. Conservatism is the view that folk 
belief and folk concept application is an important constraint on philosophical theorizing (Doris, 
Knobe, Woolfolk, 2007). For example, Al Mele states, “[A] philosophical analysis of intentional 
action that is wholly unconstrained by that concept [the folk concept] runs the risk of having 
nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter” (Mele, 2001, p. 27). If it can be 
convincingly shown that normative judgments pervasively influence judgments of intentional 
action, this would lead proponents of conservatism to a potentially uneasy choice: (a) Admit that 
a philosophically appropriate account of intentional action must account for the influence of 
normative judgments on intentional action, (b) convincingly argue that the folk are pervasively 
and systematically confused in these situations and provide some kind of error theory that would 
allow the conservative to remain conservative while rejecting the folk’s application of intentional 
action when these applications are (wrongly) influenced by normative judgments, (c) or reject 
5conservatism when it comes to the influence of normative judgments on judgments of intentional 
action.1
Another philosophically relevant debate for which these views are potentially important 
concerns the debate over the fundamental nature of folk psychology and the pervasiveness of 
moral cognition. By folk psychology, I simply mean the pre-theoretical system of inferences that 
we make about the mental states, behavior, causes, etc. of others and their actions. Many in 
philosophy and psychology have proffered the view that folk psychology is fundamentally a 
system employed for explanation and prediction (Churchland, 1989; Gopnik & Melzoff, 1997, 
Gordon, 1986; Goldman, 1989).2 However, on the basis that normative judgments pervasively 
influence judgments of intentional action and other folk psychological judgments, Joshua Knobe 
(Knobe, 2006; Knobe, 2010) has argued that the evidence should lead one to a completely 
different conclusion: At its base, folk psychology has a fundamentally normative component that 
is completely independent of any role for explanation and prediction.3
Additionally, as is evident with the story of Elijah and Sacha and perhaps even more 
prominently displayed in legal examples, central to our everyday and legal understanding of 
responsibility and punishment include issues involving judgments of intentional action. Just as 
Elijah would have been considered more fully responsible if he intentionally knocked down 
                                                
1 Even revisionists, who are willing to flaunt certain supposed constraints of folk usage of a 
concept, should find the patterns of folk application of a concept relevant, as I take it that it is 
important for the revisionists (and philosophy in general) to understand just how revisionary and 
in what regards their accounts are revisionary.
2 Though generally recognized as competing theories about folk psychology, theory theorists, 
simulation theorists, and eliminativists as represented by Churchland share the commonality of 
viewing folk psychology as being fundamentally a system employed for explanation and 
prediction.
3 The ‘completely independent’ clause of Knobe’s account is a very important one, as other 
researchers who admit that normative judgments pervasively influence folk psychological 
judgments have tried to work this fact into a framework of explanation and prediction (see for 
example Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010, Pizarro & Tannenbaum, forthcoming). 
6Sacha, judgments concerning one’s degree of responsibility for acts ranging from violating the 
dress code of a party to harming the environment, from walking in on someone using the 
restroom to the destruction of property, and so forth generally depend, at least in part, on 
judgments concerning whether the act was committed intentionally. However, if judgments of 
intentional action are being influenced by normative judgments, then this bidirectional 
relationship between judgments of intentional action and normative judgments calls into question 
whether judgments of intentional action can function as the sorts of judgments that can, 
independently and impartially, guide judgments of responsibility (or wrongness of act or etc.)
A related philosophically relevant issue—one with practical implications for law—has to 
do with issues this debate raises for the potential of jury impartiality (Nadelhoffer, 2006). 
Potential criminal acts are, in part, differentiated by mens rea conditions even in cases where the 
outcome is the same. Mens rea is Latin for guilty mind and refers to the mental states an offender 
had in relation to the act. Mens rea conditions can refer to whether an offender committed an act 
knowingly, willingly, purposefully, intentionally, with forethought, with malice, etc. For 
example, consider a case in which a jury is faced with determining the appropriate conviction for 
someone who has taken the life of another. Assuming that the taking of the life did not occur in 
the commission of another felony, the choice of conviction may come down to a choice between 
murder or manslaughter. To put the weight of this decision in practical terms, a conviction of 
murder is typically accompanied by a punishment ranging from 20 years to life in prison. A 
conviction of manslaughter is typically accompanied by a punishment of up to five years in 
prison. In this case, one way in which murder may be distinguished from manslaughter is 
whether the defendant took the life intentionally as in the case of murder (Model Penal Code, § 
24.02) or whether the taking of the life was merely reckless (and not intentional) as in the case of 
7manslaughter (Model Penal Code, § 24.05). Thus, getting the conviction correct comes down to a 
determination of whether or not the defendant intentionally took the life or whether the taking of 
the life was merely reckless. However, if normative judgments sometimes influence our 
judgments of intentional action, the ability of jurors to impartially determine whether or not the 
defendant acted intentionally is extremely suspect, as it seems that we may be predisposed to 
judge norm violations, like the taking of another’s life, as being brought about intentionally. In 
other words, due to the influence of normative judgments, a jury would be more likely to convict 
the defendant of murder than manslaughter all other things being equal. 
All of these philosophically relevant problems would disappear4if it could be shown that, 
in fact, normative judgments do not influence folk judgments of intentional action. One recent 
and prominent account that attempts to show that normative judgments are not influencing folk 
judgments of intentional action—and thus, if correct, would make the above-mentioned 
problems disappear—is Chandra Sripada’s Deep Self Model of Intentionality and Responsibility 
(hereafter, ‘Deep Self Model’) (Sripada, 2010; Sripada & Konrath, forthcoming). In brief, 
Sripada claims that normative judgments do not play a role in the production of judgments of 
intentional action (above and beyond the influence of the relevant, non-normative judgments); 
rather what he calls ‘deep self concordance’ judgments are of primary importance for the 
production of judgments of intentional action (‘deep self concordance’ will be explained in 
greater detail in Section 3).
                                                
4 At the very least, if these problems persisted, it would be due to content from sources outside of 
the debate of current topic. For example, the concern of juror impartiality will not go away if it 
could be shown that normative judgments are not influencing intentional action judgments. 
Likely, the problem would still persist due to issues such as stereotyping, prejudice, etc. Rather, 
showing that normative judgments are not influencing intentional action judgments would show 
that problems of juror impartiality qua normative-judgments-acting-as-inputs-into-intentional-
action-judgments go away.
8In this thesis, I will argue that Sripada’s model falls short of being able to convincingly 
demonstrate that normative judgments are not influencing folk judgments of intentional action, 
and as a consequence, the above-mentioned philosophical problems remain real problems. Along 
the way, I will offer a more plausible version of a deep-self model—one that is explicitly 
bidirectional. 
The thesis is organized as follows: In the next section, I briefly present some evidence for 
the claim that normative judgments do in fact influence judgments of intentional action. In 
Section 3, I offer a somewhat detailed account of the Deep Self Model. In Sections 4 and 5, I 
outline two methodological issues with Sripada’s attempt to empirically test his model (Sripada 
and Konrath, forthcoming). The dialectical role of these sections will be two-fold: First, the 
problems shed doubts on Sripada’s empirical findings and his interpretation of his findings, 
hence raising doubts concerning the empirical support for his theoretical model. Second, the 
problems raised are meant to motivate an empirical re-analysis of his model using corrected 
methodology. In Section 6, I offer a sketch of a plausible bidirectional deep-self model, and then 
demonstrate that once the methodological issues raised in Sections 4 and 5 are corrected, the 
evidence favors the view that, at least in some cases, normative judgments are influencing 
judgments of intentional action above and beyond the influence of deep-self judgments. In other 
words, the evidence favors the predictions made by a bidirectional deep-self model over 
Sripada’s Deep Self Model. In Section 7, I present the results of a new experiment that was 
designed to test additional predictions of the kind of bidirectional deep-self model that I outline 
in Section 6. In Section 8, I conclude with a brief discussion concerning how the results reported 
in this paper may shed light on the status of the above-mentioned philosophically relevant 
debates about people’s judgments of intentional action. 
92. THE SIDE-EFFECT EFFECT: EVIDENCE FOR BIDIRECTIONALISM
A major part of the bidirectionalists’ argument against the descriptive component of 
unidirectionalism relies on a growing body of experimental evidence that appears to support a 
bidirectional account.
Take for example, the now classic study on intentional action by Joshua Knobe (2003a). 
In this study, Knobe randomly presented participants with one of two vignettes. Both vignettes 
involved a decision made by the chairman of the board of a company. The only thing that 
differed about the vignettes was the moral valence of a foreseen side effect of the chairman’s 
decision. In this case, it was whether the environment was harmed or helped as a result of the 
chairman’s decision to implement a new policy. The harm vignette read as follows:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We 
are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will 
also harm the environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed. 
The help vignette read exactly as the harm vignette, except all instances of ‘harm’ 
language were replaced with ‘help’ language. 
After participants were presented with the vignette, they were asked if the chairman 
intentionally harmed [helped] the environment. When presented with the harm condition, 82 
10
percent of the participants judged that the chairman intentionally harmed the environment, 
whereas in the help condition, only 23 percent judged that the chairman intentionally helped the 
environment. This asymmetrical pattern of attribution based on changes in the moral valence of a 
side effect has become known as the side-effect effect.
These results have been replicated using a diverse array of vignettes (see for example, 
Knobe 2003b, Mallon 2008, Nadelhoffer 2004b), in a diverse array of populations, including 
with Hindi speakers when the vignettes are translated into Hindi (Knobe & Burra 2006), with 
four-year old children (Leslie et al. 2006), and with subjects who suffer from deficits in 
emotional processing due to lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Young et al. 2006). 
Similar asymmetrical patterns of attribution have also been found for the attributions of 
knowledge (Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010), valuing (Knobe & Roedder, 2009), decided, advocated, 
and in favor of (Pettit and Knobe, 2009), causation (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009), and act 
individuation (Ulatowski, ms).
These above-cited examples of the replications and generalizations of the side-effect 
effect (and side-effect effect-like effects) are but a small fraction of the entire body of literature 
covering the persistence and pervasiveness of the side-effect effect, not to mention sources of 
evidence outside of side-effect effect studies that suggest that normative judgments can, and 
often do, influence judgments of intentional action. This growing body of evidence requires 
explanation. The consensus view is that descriptive bidirectionalism is the best explanation. If 
these researchers are right, then the philosophically relevant issues raised in the introduction of 
this thesis remain very real problems with which philosophers (and others) will have to contend. 
However, in spite of this growing consensus, some researchers have attempted to maintain a 
descriptive unidirectional account of the data. One of these researcher’s is Chandra Sripada, who 
11
offers a descriptive unidirectional model that he calls the Deep Self Concordance Model of 
Intentionality and Responsibility (‘Deep Self Model’). In the following section, I will turn to 
giving a detailed exposition of Sripada’s Deep Self Model. 
3 THE DEEP SELF MODEL
In rejection of a bidirectional account of the side-effect effect, in particular, and 
judgments of intentional action, more generally, Sripada offers the Deep Self Model. The Deep 
Self Model consists of two main theses: First, normative judgments are not influencing 
judgments of intentional action. Second, rather, “deep self concordance” judgments are primarily 
responsible for our judgments of intentional action. Deep-self judgments are attributions about an 
agent’s stable attitudes, values, and behavioral dispositions (Sripada, 2010; Sripada & Konrath, 
forthcoming). This notion of a ‘deep self’ is borrowed form Hume and can be contrasted with 
one’s acting self. Additionally, these deep-self judgments are similar to what some psychologists 
call dispositional attributions and are meant to be trait-like attributions. Deep-self concordance 
occurs when the psychological attitudes of the agent’s deep self concords, or matches up with, an 
act. So, deep-self concordance judgments are judgments, generally made by a third party, that an 
agent’s deep self concords with some act.
Sripada’s Deep Self Model proposes that when someone believes that an agent’s actions 
are in concordance with the agent’s deep self (i.e., when the action concords with the agent’s 
underlying values and attitudes), she will be more likely to say that the agent intentionally 
committed the act in question. According to the model, when trying to figure out whether an 
agent’s deep self is in concordance with an action, people consider non-normative facts about the 
situation and are not making judgments based on normative considerations.
In the case of Knobe’s chairman vignettes, in both the harm and the help scenarios, the 
chairman expresses not caring about bringing about the side effect of harming [helping] the 
12
environment. According to Sripada, the statement of indifference toward the environmental 
outcome may be taken to express general contempt or hostility toward the environment. Thus, in 
both conditions, participants attribute anti-environmental attitudes toward the chairman. 
However, only in the harm condition does the chairman bring about an outcome that is in 
concordance with the attribution of anti-environmental attitudes. Thus, according to the model, it 
should be more likely that the participants will say that the chairman intentionally harmed the 
environment in the harm condition than the participants would be willing to say the chairman 
intentionally helped the environment in the help condition. Sripada’s model would also predict 
that if participants attributed pro-environmental attitudes to the chairman, then intentionality 
attributions would be more likely in cases where the chairman helped the environment. 
To test the Deep Self Model, Sripada and Konrath (forthcoming) randomly assigned 240 
participants to the harm or the help condition of Knobe’s chairman vignette. Following the 
vignette, participants were presented with six questions: one question concerning whether the 
chairman intentionally harmed [helped] the environment, two questions that were meant to 
measure key candidate explanatory variables for two different bidirectional accounts, two 
questions that were meant to measure candidate explanatory variables for Sripada’s Deep Self 
Model, and a question about the participants’ own values concerning the environment. See Table 
1 for a summary of the questions asked and the model that each question was meant to represent.
Sripada and Konrath analyzed their data using a Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
method known as structural path analysis. SEM is a statistical technique that allows for the 
simultaneous measurement of multiple and complex linear relationships among observed or 
latent variables. Before continuing, it will be helpful to review some basic SEM terminology. 
Structural path analysis is an SEM technique that only uses observed variables. A path diagram 
13
Table 1. Questions from Sripada and Konrath’s (forthcoming) study on intentional action.
Question Anchors for 7-point 
scale
Abbreviated 
Variable Name
Model (author to whom 
Sripada ascribed model)
How much do you agree with the 
statement ‘The Chairman intentionally 
harmed [helped] the environment’?
Strongly Agree,
Strongly Disagree
Intentionality 
Judgments
N/A
In your view, how good or bad is the 
outcome that the environment is 
harmed [helped]?
Very Good,
Very Bad
Goodness/Badness 
Judgments
Good/Bad Model, 
bidirectional (Knobe, 
2005, 2006, no longer 
endorses model; 
Buckwalter & Beebe, 
2010) 
In your view, what is the Chairman’s 
moral status?
Very Moral,
Very Immoral
Moral Status 
Judgments
Moral Status Model, 
bidirectional (Alicke, 
2008, 1982)
What are the Chairman’s values and 
attitudes towards the environment?
Very Pro-environment,
Very Anti-environment
Chairman 
Values/Attitudes 
Judgments
Deep Self Model, 
unidirectional (Sripada, 
forthcoming)
In the vignette above, the Chairman’s 
action brings about an outcome in 
which the environment is harmed 
[helped]. In your view, to what extent 
is the Chairman the kind of person 
who will, in other contexts and 
situations, bring about outcomes 
similar to this one?
Very Likely,
Very unlikely
Generalizability 
Judgments
Deep Self Model, 
unidirectional (Sripada, 
forthcoming)
What are your own values and 
attitudes towards the environment?
Very Pro-environment,
Very Anti-environment
Personal 
Values/Attitudes 
Judgments
Indirect Influence Model, 
bidirectional (Petit & 
Knobe 2009)
14
is a pictorial representation of the structural model. A structural model is the set of equations that 
represent the relationships among the variables in the model. So, a path diagram is a pictorial 
representation of the relationships among the variables in the model. Each structural path in a 
path diagram is meant to represent a causal relationship between two variables. Associated with 
each structural path is a path coefficient. The path coefficient represents the magnitude of the 
relationship between the two variables a structural path connects, controlling for the relationships 
of the other variables in the model. If certain assumptions are met, namely that the structural 
model has not mis-specified the causal relationships among the variables, the path coefficients 
can be interpreted as representing the strength of the causal relationship an independent variable 
has on a dependent variable, controlling for the effects of all the other variables in the model. 
The interpretations of these causal relationships are also expressed in the vocabulary of the path 
coefficient representing the unique causal contribution (or effect) of an independent variable on a 
dependent variable or in the vocabulary of the path coefficient representing the causal 
contribution (or effect) of an independent variable on a dependent variable, above and beyond 
the causal contribution (or effects) of all other variables on in the model. These path coefficients 
can be represented in standardized or unstandardized terms. If the path coefficient is a 
standardized path coefficient, then the path coefficient can be interpreted as the expected change 
in the dependent variable per standard deviation unit change in the independent variable, 
controlling for all the other variables in the model. If the path coefficient is an unstandardized 
path coefficient, then the path coefficient can be interpreted as the expected change in the 
dependent variable per unit change (using the original units in which the variables were 
measured) in the independent variable, controlling for all the other variables in the model. 
So far all this terminology should sound familiar to those familiar with standard 
15
regression. In one sense, structural path analysis just is a set of regression formulas. So, if you 
are familiar with regression and if it helps you to think about structural path analysis in terms of 
regression analyses, it is perfectly acceptable to interpret the path coefficients just as you would 
interpret regression coefficients. However, SEM does have some advantages over basic 
regression analyses. First, SEM allows the modeling of relationships among latent variables. 
Latent variables are variables that are not directly observed, but are variables that underlie the 
production of directly observable variables. Latent variables are not being utilized in any of the 
analyses reported or conducted in this paper, so a more in-depth explanation or understanding of 
the nature of latent variables is not needed. Second, SEM allows for the modeling of more 
complex relationships than what standard regression allows. Third, SEM provides a method to 
evaluate the ‘fit’ of a structural model against the data. Every structural model implies a specific 
covariance matrix. A covariance matrix is simply an unstandardized correlational matrix, and 
thus represents the relationships of associations among all the variables in the model. To test the 
fit of a structural model, the structural model’s implied covariance matrix is compared to the 
covariance matrix of the actual data set. There are a number of different fit indices. Fit indices
are indices of how well the structural model’s implied covariance matrix fits the covariance 
matrix of the actual data set. Or, in other words, the fit indices are indices of whether or not, or 
the extent to which, the structural model’s implied covariance matrix varies from the covariance 
matrix of the actual data set. The most widely reported fit index is the 2 statistic. A significant 
2 statistic implies that the structural model’s implied covariance matrix varies from the 
covariance of the actual data set with statistical significance. However, there remain various 
debates in the literature concerning the use of the 2 statistic as an absolute arbitrator between 
those models that have “good fit” and those that do not. Often other fit indices are used as 
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evidence of good fit, either as a supplement to the evidence provided by a 2 statistic or 
sometimes in lieu of a 2 statistic.
With this technical apparatus under our command, we are now in a position to be able to 
understand and interpret Sripada and Konrath’s models. Figure 1 is a path diagram of the first 
model they tested. As predicted by Sripada and Konrath’s Deep Self Model, the analysis showed 
that the two normative variables had no effect on intentionality judgments above and beyond the 
effects of the deep-self variables and the experimental manipulation. This can be seen by looking 
at the path coefficients associated with the structural paths from moral status judgments to 
intentionality judgments and from goodness/badness judgments to intentionality judgments. 
Neither of these path coefficients represents a statistically significant relationship. Thus, there is 
no evidence that the strength of these relationships differs from zero, when controlling for all the 
other variables in the model. In other words, there is no evidence of an effect of moral status 
judgments on intentionality judgments above and beyond the effect of the other variables in the 
model nor is there evidence of an effect of goodness/badness judgments on intentionality 
judgments above and beyond the effect of the other variables in the model. Additionally, the 
analysis showed that the deep-self variables and the experimental manipulation had significant 
effects on intentionality judgments above and beyond the effects of all the other variables in the 
model. 
The final model Sripada and Konrath tested was their hypothesized Deep Self Model (the 
base model minus the paths between the normative variables and intentionality judgments) plus 
the addition of a single empirically driven modification (an added path between 
goodness/badness judgments and chairman values/attitudes judgments). Based on all reported fit 
indices, their final model fit the data well, thus providing additional support for the two major
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Case
Moral Status 
Judgments
Goodness/
Badness 
Judgments
Chairman 
Values/
Attitudes
Judgment
General-
izability 
Judgments
Intentionality 
Judgments
.22***
.76***
.77***
.72***
.04
-.02
.30***
.30***
.24***
Figure 1. Sripada and Konrath’s (forthcoming) base model.
Note: All path coefficients are expressed in standardized units. * p< .005, ** p <.01, *** p < 
.001. 
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hypothesis of the Deep Self Concordance Model—that is, for the hypothesis that deep-self 
judgments are a major driving force behind the pattern of intentional action judgments and for 
the hypothesis that normative judgments do not have an impact on intentional action judgments 
above and beyond the impact of deep-self judgments. See Figure 2 for the path diagram of their 
final model.
Sripada and Konrath followed this study with a second study that examined what people 
think drives the asymmetric intentionality responses in the chairman case. This second study was 
motivated by the fact that although Sripada and Konrath “provided strong evidence that deep 
self-related factors explain a majority of the asymmetric judgment effect in the chairman case, 
while normative factors account for a small minority of the asymmetry[,] … based on the 
experience of [Sripada] in presenting the Deep Self Model to audiences in papers and talks, in 
terms of intuitive appeal, the order of priority is fully reversed – most people find normative 
factor models highly intuitive (and indeed some think it is simply obvious that these models are 
correct), while they find the Deep Self Model far less intuitive” (Sripada & Konrath, 
forthcoming, draft p. 15).
Of the participants who were a part of Sripada and Konrath’s second study, 76% gave 
open-ended responses that implicated normative variables as the probable cause of the 
asymmetry while 7% gave open-ended responses that implicated deep-self variables as the 
probable cause of the asymmetry. The remainder gave responses that were classified as not 
falling into either category. In light of these results, Sripada and Konrath concluded that their 
participants, along with audience members at their talks, were experiencing a tracking problem
when trying to explain the reasons why the asymmetry arises. To justify this tracking problem 
explanation, Sripada and Konrath paid homage to Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) influential
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Case
Moral Status 
Judgments
General-
izability 
Judgments
Intentionality 
Judgments
  
Figure 2. Sripada and Konrath’s (forthcoming) final model.
Note: All path coefficients are expressed in standardized units. * p< .005, ** p <.01, *** p < 
.001. Overall model fit, 2(6) = 12.00, p= .06; NFI = .985; NNFI = .981; CFI = .992; RMSEA = 
.065.
Goodness/
Badness 
Judgments
Chairman 
Values/
Attitudes
Judgment
.22***
.76***
.65***
.72***
.30***
.29***
.24***
.16**
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article “Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.” Nisbett and 
Wilson’s review of hundreds of studies provided extensive evidence that even though people are 
generally able to accurately state outcomes of judgment processes, they have very little ability to 
introspectively identify the intervening judgments and inferences that played a role in producing 
judgment outputs. Mis-implications of certain judgments tend to occur when (1) the critical 
features that drive the judgment are low in salience and the influences of these features on 
judgment processes are not easily accessible to conscious awareness, and (2) there is some other 
feature of the situation that is high in salience and that is more readily accessible to awareness. 
When these two conditions are met, people have a greater tendency to implicate the feature that 
is high in salience even if this highly salient feature plays no role in the actual judgment 
outcome, while ignoring the low-salient feature.
Sripada and Konrath see the chairman case as clearly meeting these features. First, the 
manipulation of the moral valance of the scenario is highly salient. Second, the attributions of 
dispositions, such as the attribution of underlying values and attitudes and behavioral 
dispositions, are often spontaneous, implicit, and automatic (see Uleman, et al., 2008, for a 
recent review of the spontaneous trait inferences literature). To help avoid the tracking problem 
when theorizing and when testing theories concerning complex judgment processes such as those 
that may appear in the side-effect effect, Sripada and Konrath recommend that more of the field 
move toward the more sophisticated statistical tools of Structural Equation Modeling, since SEM 
is particularly well suited for separating out unique influences of multiple variables on some 
given (set of) dependent variable(s).
Going forward, I will argue that, even though it may appear that Sripada and Konrath 
have provided strong evidence that deep-self judgments play a significant role in the asymmetric 
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pattern of intentionality judgments in Knobe’s chairman case, while normative judgments play 
no (or at most an irrelevantly small) role in the asymmetric pattern of intentionality judgments in 
Knobe’s chairman case, Sripida and Konrath’s experimental evidence simply does not justify the 
conclusion that normative judgments are playing no role in the production of intentionality 
judgments in Knobe’s chairman case. Rather, I will argue that a more plausible version of a 
deep-self model is one that is explicitly bidirectional. That is, I will argue that a more plausible 
deep-self model is one that admits that both deep-self judgments and normative judgments play 
an important role in the production of judgments of intentional action.
In the next two sections, I outline two methodological issues with Sripada’s attempt to 
empirically test his model (Sripada and Konrath, forthcoming). The first issue, taken up in 
Section 4, involves the problem of implicitly modeling interaction terms. The second issue, taken 
up in Section 5, involves the problem of using manipulation checks as mediators. The dialectical 
role of these sections will be two-fold: First, the problems shed doubts on Sripada’s empirical 
findings and his interpretation of his findings, hence raising doubts concerning the empirical 
support for his theoretical model. Second, the problems raised are meant to motivate an empirical 
re-analysis of his model using corrected methodology. In Section 6, I offer a sketch of a plausible 
bidirectional deep-self model, and then demonstrate that once the methodological issues raised in 
Sections 4 and 5 are corrected, the evidence favors the view that, at least in some cases, 
normative judgments are influencing judgments of intentional action above and beyond the 
influence of deep-self judgments. In other words, the evidence favors the predictions made by a 
bidirectional deep-self model over Sripada’s Deep Self Model. In Section 7, I present the results 
of a new experiment that was designed to test additional predictions of the kind of bidirectional 
deep-self model that I outline in Section 6. In Section 8, I conclude with a brief discussion 
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concerning how the results reported in this paper may shed light on the status of the above-
mentioned philosophically relevant debates about people’s judgments of intentional action.
4 THE PROBLEM OF MODELING IMPLICIT INTERACTION TERMS
*** TECHICAL DISCUSSION WARNING: This section involves either a fairly 
technical discussion of methodological and statistical issues or the reporting of various statistical 
results. While it is not necessary to understand all the technical methodological and statistical 
points, understanding these points can help the reader have a greater appreciation and 
understanding for what is going. Additionally, in order to keep the results as transparent as 
possible, I am not relegating the reporting of the more technical aspect of the statistics to 
footnotes and appendices. Those without expertise in statistical interpretation should not be off-
put or overwhelmed by the reporting of these statistics. Rather, one without expertise in 
statistical interpretation can gloss over the more technical aspects of the reporting and simply 
focus on the English interpretations of the statistics. Subsequent section that contain technical 
discussions of methodological or statistical points will be marked by an asterisk. ***
The problem highlighted in this section might be summarized in a very general form as 
follows: The way Sripada and Konrath use the chairman’s values/attitudes judgments variable in 
their model does not appear to be the best way to conceptualize the variable given their 
theoretical model. Their conceptualization and use of the chairman’s values/attitudes judgments 
variable causes a mismatch between their theoretical model and their statistical model. In the last 
subsection of this section, I demonstrate that when using a conceptualization of the chairman’s 
values/attitudes judgments variable that better matches the theoretical model, my replication of 
Sripada and Konrath’s model no longer fits the data as well. This in turn provides some evidence 
against Sripada and Konrath’s theoretical model. 
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Before continuing, it will be helpful to get a little bit of terminology out of the way
regarding path coefficients and fit indices, both of which were briefly defined above (pp. 12-13), 
and mediator variables and moderator variables. A mediator variable is a causal intermediary 
variable through which the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable can be 
accounted for or explained. Mediation is said to occur to the extent that the mediator variable can 
account for or explain the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Partial 
mediation occurs when the mediator partially accounts for or explains the effect of an 
independent variable on a dependent variable. Full mediation occurs when the mediator fully 
accounts for or explains the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable. 
A moderator variable is a variable that affects the direction or strength of the relationship 
between an independent variable and a dependent variable. Moderation effects are also known as
interaction effects. When demonstrating moderation in a regression, SEM, or other similar 
frameworks, the standard methodology requires one to create an interaction term, which, in the 
case of linear moderation effects, is created by multiplying the moderator variable and the 
independent variable together and then using this product as the newly formed interaction term. 
Moderation and mediation are two very distinct types of effects. In spite of their conceptual 
distinctness, moderation and mediation are often confused in much of the social science 
literature. Confusing moderators and mediators can lead to serious problems with one’s 
theoretical model, statistical model, or interpretation of the models (depending at which point the 
conceptual confusion occurred). (See Baron & Kenny, 1986 for a detailed discussion of the 
moderator-mediator distinction, along with a discussion of standard methodology for testing 
moderation and mediation; see Shrout & Bolger, 2002 for a detailed discussion of mediation and 
various ways mediation effects can be measured.)
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With this terminology out of the way, let’s consider the relevance of these issues to the 
current discussion. The primary claim of this section is that Sripada and Konrath recoded the 
chairman values/attitudes judgments to implicitly reflect an effect of moderation, instead of 
explicitly modeling a moderation effect. Because of this decision to use a recoded variable, the 
chairman values/attitudes judgments, which theoretically is meant to be a moderator variable, 
ends up being treated as a mediator variable in the statistical model. Furthermore, this recoding 
of the chairman values/attitudes judgments leads to several interpretative and statistical 
difficulties. However, even ignoring the specific interpretative and statistical inaccuracies that I 
point out below, Sripada and Konrath’s decision to use a variable that implicitly reflects a 
moderation effect remains problematic, if for no other reason than this recoding caused a 
variable that is theoretically a moderator to be treated as a mediator in their statistical model. 
Given Sripada and Konrath’s explanation of the application of the Deep Self Model to the 
chairman case, the path coefficient that represents the relationship between case and chairman 
values/attitudes judgments appears not to support part of this explanation.
Applying the Deep Self Model to the chairman case, the model first predicts that 
in both the harm and help condition, people ascribe to the chairman core 
underlying anti-environment values and attitudes. This is because the chairman 
says ‘I don’t care at all about harming [helping] the environment’, which is taken 
to express contempt or hostility toward the environment. (Sripada and Konrath, 
forthcoming, draft p. 6)
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Here, Sripada and Konrath predict that there should be little-to-no effect of case on 
chairman values/attitudes judgments, yet in their statistical model, the path coefficient associated 
with the relationship between case and chairman values/attitudes judgments is representative of a 
large effect. However, this seemingly contradictory result may not be due to a failure of 
prediction; rather it may be due to the fact that Sripada and Konrath recoded the chairman 
values/attitudes judgments variable to implicitly reflect a moderation effect (instead of explicitly 
modeling a moderation effect).  Here is there explanation of their decision:
The predictions of the Deep Self Model require that the chairman values/attitudes 
judgments variable be ‘reverse coded’ in one of the two conditions. Reverse 
coding means that the variable is flipped around its midpoint. Thus on a 7 point 
scale, a 1 is scored as a 7, a two as a 6, and so on. Reverse coding of this variable 
is required for one of the two conditions because the Deep Self Model predicts 
correlations of opposite directions in the two conditions. That is, according to the 
Deep Self Model, in the harm condition, rating the chairman as more anti-
environment predicts greater agreement with the statement that the chairman 
intentionality harmed the environment. But in the help condition, rating the 
chairman as more anti-environment predicts lesser agreement with the statement 
that the chairman intentionality helped the environment. (note 8)
Here, Sripada and Konrath’s application of the Deep Self Model to the chairman case 
predicts that case moderates the effect of chairman values/attitudes judgments on intentionality 
judgments. This should be clear, as Sripada and Konrath explicitly state that the direction of the 
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effect of chairman values/attitudes judgments on intentionality judgments depends on level of 
case (case having two levels: harm, help). This moderation claim is statistically equivalent to the 
claim that chairman values/attitudes judgments moderate the effect of case on intentionality 
judgments.5 If we expressed the moderation effect in this way, we would want to say that the 
direction (or strength) of the effect of case on intentionality judgments depends on level of 
chairman values/attitudes judgments (chairman values/attitudes judgments having continuum of 
levels ranging from 1 to 7). To put this a little more concretely, under the predictions of Sripada 
and Konrath’s model, we would say that when people attribute anti-environmental values and 
attitudes to the chairman, they should be more likely to attribute intentionality to the chairman 
when the chairman harms the environment than when he helps the environment. On Sripada’s 
account, this expectation would be because anti-environmental attitudes and harming the 
environment concord. On the other hand, when people attribute pro-environmental values and 
attitudes to the chairman, they should be more likely to attribute intentionality to the chairman 
when the chairman helps the environment. Again, on Sripada’s account, this expectation would 
be because pro-environmental attitudes and helping the environment concord.6 Instead of 
including an explicit interaction term in their model, Sripada and Konrath recoded the chairman 
                                                
5 This fact of equivalence is important for the purposes of this paper, as in Sections 6 & 7, I will 
choose to conceptualize the moderation effect as chairman values/attitudes judgments 
moderating the effect of case on intentionality judgments. Given that these claims are equivalent, 
nothing substantial rides on the choice of the ways to express the relationship. However, given 
what I show in Sections 6 & 7, the interpretation becomes a bit easier if the moderation is 
expressed in this manner. However, the exact same effect – and problems for Sripada’s account –
could be shown if I chose to express the moderation effect as case moderating the effect of 
chairman values/attitudes judgments on intentionality judgments.
6 Additionally, this moderation effect strictly implies that when people attribute ambivalent 
environmental values and attitudes to the chairman, there should be no difference in 
intentionality attributions by case.
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values/attitudes judgments to reflect the predicted moderation effect. The choice not to use an 
explicit interaction term leads to both interpretive and statistical inaccuracies. 
On the interpretative side, one of the problems this recoding creates is the production of a 
model that is incapable of straightforwardly capturing the hypothesized relationship between 
case and chairman values/attitudes judgments. Sripada and Konrath’s statistical model makes it 
appear as if there is a strong relationship between case and chairman values/attitudes judgments; 
however, their explanation of the application of their theoretical model to the chairman case 
predicts that there should be little to no effect of case on chairman values/attitudes judgments, 
since the chairman ‘does not care at all’ about the effects on the environment in either case. That 
is, their model predicts that people should respond that he has negative attitudes towards the 
environment in both cases. By using a recoded chairman values/attitudes judgments variable, 
there is no straightforward way to interpret the path coefficients such that one can discern the 
relationship between case and chairman values/attitudes judgments. 
Another interpretative difficulty appears in Sripada and Konrath’s final model in which 
they model a path between goodness/badness judgments and the recoded chairman 
values/attitudes judgments. It is not even clear what this structural path would represent. 
Statistically, this method of modeling the paths is not the same as modeling a path between 
goodness/badness judgments and an explicit interaction term. Furthermore, theoretically, this 
method of modeling the paths is not the same as modeling a relationship between 
goodness/badness judgments and a non-recoded chairman values/attitudes judgments. Finally, 
just to reiterate, the most significant problem with Sripada and Konrath’s use of the recoded 
goodness/badness judgment is that the variable ends up being treated as a mediator in the model 
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when the variable is described as a moderator in their theoretical model. This confusion can lead 
to numerous conceptual and interpretive flaws (Baron and Kenny, 1986).  
On the statistical side, the model with the implicitly recoded values/attitudes judgments 
variable is not statistically equivalent to a model that includes an explicit interaction term. This 
means the model fit will probably differ between the two models. 
To test the hypothesis that the model fit between the two models differs, I will be using 
new data that I collected as part of a larger study that seeks to explore various relationships 
among normative judgments and folk psychological judgments. Specifically, I will run two sets 
of structural path analyses. The first analysis will be a replication of Sripada and Konrath’s 
model as they ran it (i.e., with a recoded chairman values/attitudes judgment variable that 
implicitly reflects the moderation effect). The second analysis will be a replication of Sripada 
and Konrath’s model using an explicit interaction term. I predict that a model using an explicit 
interaction term will better capture the predictions of Sripada and Konrath’s explanation of their 
application of the Deep Self Model to the chairman case. That is, I predict that the path 
coefficient for the structural path that represents the effect of case on chairman values/attitudes 
judgments will not be statistically significant or will only be representative of a very small effect 
size, and I predict that the path coefficient representing the moderation effect will be significant. 
Furthermore, I predict that the model that uses the explicit interaction term will perform worse 
on all fit indices when compared to the model that uses the recoded chairman values/attitudes 
judgments. If these predictions are right, this would leave Sripada with the choice of choosing 
between (a) a model that more accurately captures specific predictions about certain paths but 
performs worse on fit indexes or (b) a potentially problematic model that cannot 
straightforwardly capture all the specific predictions about certain paths but performs better on 
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fit indexes. In other words, if these predictions are right, they would show that when an 
improved-theory-matching methodology is used, Sripada’s model is not as well supported (via 
worse performing fit indices). 
4.2 Methods
Participants (n = 699) were students at Georgia State University enrolled in a critical 
thinking course. For their participation, participants were offered extra credit at the instructor’s 
discretion. All participants were randomly assigned to one of four vignette conditions, including 
the two vignette conditions used by Sripida and Konrath, as well as two other conditions to be 
discussed in Section 6. Following the presentation of the vignette, participants were presented 
with a series of questions, a subset of which were the same questions Sripida and Konrath used 
in their study. See Table 1 for the questions used in Sripada and Konrath’s original study. In 
order to eliminate potential order effects and carry-over effects, a Williams design (Williams, 
1949), which is Latin Square randomization balanced for first-order carry-over effects, was 
employed. Participants who did not finish the survey or who missed a simple comprehension 
check had their data dropped from analysis, resulting in n = 551. Only data from the two 
conditions used in Sripida and Konrath’s study were used in the current analysis, resulting n = 
299. All surveys were conducted online using standard survey software.
4.3 Results and Discussion*
Two structural path analyses were run. In the first analysis, Sripada and Konrath’s base 
model was run as they ran it. That is, the chairman values/attitudes judgments were recoded to 
implicitly reflect the interaction. In the second analysis, a model analogous to Sripada and 
Konrath’s base model was ran using a non-recoded chairman values/attitudes judgments variable 
along with an explicit case x chairman values/attitudes judgments interaction term. The 
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interaction term was created by multiplying together the dummy-coded case variable by the 
chairman values/attitudes judgments. See Figure 3 for the path diagram of the model that used 
the recoded chairman values/attitudes judgment variable. See Figure 4 for the path diagram of 
the model that used the explicit interaction term. 
The statistical model with the explicit interaction term better matches the predictions of 
Sripada and Konrath’s explanation of the application of the Deep Self Model to the chairman 
case. As predicted by Sripada and Konrath, there were no differences in chairman 
values/attitudes judgments between the harm and help conditions. Furthermore, as predicted by 
the Deep Self Model, there is a significant interaction between case and chairman 
values/attitudes judgments. However, the model with the explicit interaction term performed 
worse on all the available fit indices.7 In other words, once an improved-theory-matching 
methodology is used, Sripida and Konrath’s model no longer fits the data as well. See Table 2 
for a summary of fit indices for both models.
However, this result simply sheds doubt concerning overall model fit. While a model 
failure can be seen as a challenge to the collection of hypotheses embedded within the model, it 
does not necessarily provide strong evidence against any specific hypothesis embedded in the 
model. Keep in mind that the Deep Self Model has two primary hypothesis: (1) deep-self 
variables are of primary importance in the production of judgments of intentional action, and (2) 
normative variables do not have an effect on judgments of intentional action above and beyond 
the effects of the deep-self variables. The second of these two hypotheses is the one that directly 
challenges the descriptive bidirectional account, and it accounts for Sripida’s model being 
appropriately considered a unidirectional account. In the next section of this thesis, I outline a
                                                
7 Similar results were found when comparing Sripida and Konrath’s final model to its two closest 
corrected analogs. 
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Moral Status 
Judgments
Goodness/
Badness 
Judgments
Chairman 
Values/
Attitudes
Judgment
General-
izability 
Judgments
Intentionality 
Judgments
.20***
.91***
-.71***
-.72***
-.038
-.159
-.28**
.24***
.09
Figure 3. Replication of Sripida and Konrath’s base model using the recoded chairman 
values/attitudes judgments to reflect an implicit interaction term.
Note: Notice that the path coefficient associated with the structural path case to chairman 
values/attitudes judgment is statistically significant and representative of a large effect. All path 
coefficients are expressed in standardized units. * p< .005, ** p <.01, *** p < .001. Overall 
model fit, 2(6) = 17.97, p = .016; CFI = .990; TLI = .975: RMSEA = .082; SRMR = .020. 
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Case
Moral Status 
Judgments
Goodness/
Badness 
Judgments
Chairman 
Values/
Attitudes
Judgment
General-
izability 
Judgments
Intentionality 
Judgments
.20***
.91***
.10
-.02
-.14
-.48***
-.24***
.24***
Values/
Attitudes by 
Case 
Interaction
-.72***
.08
Figure 4. Replication of Sripida and Konrath’s base model using an explicit interaction term.
Note: Notice that the path coefficient  associated with the structural path case to chairman 
values/attitudes judgment is not statistically significant. Also notice that the structural path 
values/attitudes by case interaction to intentionality judgments is statistically significant. Both of 
these results would be predicted based on Sripada’s theoretical model. All path coefficients are 
expressed in standardized units. * p< .005, ** p <.01, *** p < .001. Overall model fit, 2(9) = 
49.45, p < .001; CFI = .967; TLI = .926: RMSEA = .123; SRMR = .056. Interaction term was 
allowed to covary freely with both of its components.
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Table 2. Summary of fit indices for the replications of Sripida and Konrath’s base model using 
the recoded chairman values/attitudes judgments to reflect an implicit interaction term and the 
analogous model using an explicit interaction term.
Fit Index Implicit Interaction Term Explicit Interaction Term
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit 2(6) = 17.972, p = .006 2(9) = 49.452, p < .001
CFI .990 .967
TLI .975 .926
AIC 5414.752 5987.269
BIC 5485.060 6076.079
RMSEA .082 .123
SRMR .020 .056
Note: What is important here is the comparative fit between the two models. Lower scores are 
signs of better fit for the Chi-Square Test of Model Fit, the AIC, the BIC, the RMSEA, and 
SRMR. Higher scores are signs of better fit for the CFI and TLI.
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second methodological issue with the way Sripada and Konrath empirically tested their 
theoretical model—the problem of using manipulation checks as mediators. This second 
methodological issue speaks directly to the strength of the evidence that Sripada and Konrath’s 
model provides for the hypothesis that normative judgments are not influencing judgments of 
intentional action.  
5 THE PROBLEM OF USING MANIPULATION CHECKS AS MEDIATORS*
The primary claim of this section is that the observed variable goodness/badness 
judgments conceptually is a manipulation check. Here I use the term ‘manipulation check’ to 
refer to any observed variable that acts as a measure of some conceptual variable whose variation 
is (thought to be) a constitutive part of the experimental manipulation. In other words, it is a 
measurement of what the experimental manipulation is thought to be manipulating. This use of 
manipulation check is also referred to as an ‘independent variable check’ (Sigall and Mills, 
1998). Because the observed variable goodness/badness judgments is a manipulation check, the 
causal information provided by the goodness/badness judgments variable and the causal 
information provided by the manipulation of case are, in large part, redundant. Given this 
redundancy, it should not be expected that there should be a unique effect of goodness/badness 
judgments on intentionality judgments, above and beyond the effects of all the other variables in 
the model whenever the manipulation of case is included as one of the variables in the model. 
However, this failure of expectations to find a unique effect has little to nothing to do with the 
role of the deep-self variables; rather it has much more to do with the fact that the causal 
information provided by the observed variable goodness/badness judgments and the causal 
information provided by the manipulation of case are, in large part, redundant. This redundancy 
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occurs because the variation of goodness/badness judgments is a constitutive part of the 
manipulation of case. 
For our current purposes, it may be helpful to review the general form of Sripada and 
Konrath’s base model. In the base model, there is a dichotomous experimental manipulation. The 
experimental manipulation involves giving participants a vignette in which the only thing that 
changes is the moral valence of a foreseen side effect of an agent’s action—that is, the 
manipulation of whether the environment was harmed or helped as the result of the chairman’s 
decision to implement a profit-generating policy. In the base model there are also four variables 
that are construed as mediator variables. 8 The experimental manipulation along with the four 
potential mediator variables all act as potential predictors of intentionality judgments. One of the 
potential mediator variables is goodness/badness judgments. The goodness/badness judgment 
variable is a rating of the participants’ judgments about the moral valence of the side effect. It 
asks whether the harming [helping] of the environment is good or bad. With this in mind, the 
goodness/badness judgments conceptually just is a manipulation check. After all, the 
experimental manipulation was designed to manipulate the perceived moral valence of the side 
effect, and the goodness/badness judgments is meant to be a measurement of whether 
participants perceived the moral valence to have been manipulated. The other three potential 
mediator variables are ratings about various perceptions about the agent—the values and 
attitudes of the agents, the behavioral dispositions of the agent, and the moral status of the agent.
                                                
8 As pointed out in Section 4, Sripida and Konrath’s recoded chairman values/attitudes 
judgments played the role of a mediator in their statistical model even though the variable should 
have been treated at a moderator. For the specific purposes of this section nothing of importance 
rides on forcing this correction upon Sripida and Konrath’s model, so for present purposes, I will 
refer to the variables as they were used in Sripida and Konrath’s model. 
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In Sripida and Konrath’s base model, the path coefficient associated with the structural 
path goodness/badness judgments to intentionality judgments does not statistically differ from 
zero. This result leads Sripida and Konrath (forthcoming) to conclude, “This pattern is consistent 
with the hypothesis that goodness/badness judgments … are causally influenced by case, but 
goodness/badness judgments … are not themselves causes of intentionality judgments” 
(emphasis original).
However, this conclusion is not warranted. The reason goes back to the fact that, 
conceptually, the goodness/badness judgments variable just is a manipulation check. When using 
a proximal mediator—a manipulation check is the prototypical example of the most proximal of 
proximal mediators9—it is common to receive results that lead to a large path coefficient for the 
path that represents the relationship between the independent variable, in this case the 
experimental manipulation of case, and the proximal mediator, in this case goodness/badness 
judgments. Further, using a proximal mediator generally leads to a very small or null coefficient 
for the path that represents the relationship between the proximal mediator and the outcome 
variable. This leads to very small power to detect genuine indirect effects (Hoyle and Kenny, 
1999). This decreased power is generally caused by inflated standard errors due to high multi-
collinearity. These statistical results are common for proximal mediators in both experimental 
and non-experimental research; however, the problem of using a manipulation check as a 
mediator goes beyond these commonly noted problems associated with using proximal mediator.
                                                
9 Though manipulation checks are often given as examples as a proximal mediators, and I follow 
suit here, it may not be accurate to refer to manipulation checks as proximal mediators. However, 
an in-depth discussion of these issues is well beyond the scope of this current paper. For our 
current purposes, I will stick with the convention of classifying manipulation checks as a type of 
proximal mediator. 
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Recall that the path coefficients represent the unique effect of an independent variable on 
a dependent variable, above and beyond the effects of all other variables in the model. In Sripada 
and Konrath’s base model, the path coefficient that is associated with the structural path 
goodness/badness judgments to intentionality judgments represents the unique effect of 
goodness/badness judgments on intentionality judgments, above and beyond the effects of all the 
other variables in the model. Given the results of Sripada and Konrath’s model, it may be 
accurate to say that there is no unique effect of goodness/badness judgments on intentionality 
judgments above and beyond the effect of the experimental manipulation and the effects of the 
other potential mediators. However, considering that the measurement of goodness/badness 
judgments conceptually just is a manipulation check, there should not be an expectation of a 
unique effect of goodness/badness judgments on intentionality judgments above and beyond the 
effects of all the other variables in the model whenever all the other variables include the 
experimental manipulation. This failure of expectations occurs because the causal information 
conveyed by the goodness/badness judgments variable and the causal information conveyed by 
the manipulation of case are, in large part, redundant. This redundancy occurs because the 
variation of goodness/badness judgments is a constitutive part of the experimental manipulation. 
That is, the experimental manipulation is a manipulation of goodness/badness judgments.
If my claims above are correct, then several empirical results should follow. First, if the 
experimental manipulation is acting as a successful manipulation of goodness/badness judgments 
(and if the observed variable goodness/badness judgments is an accurate measurement of this 
manipulation), then we should expect to find a strong positive correlation between the 
manipulation of case and goodness/badness judgments. Second, if the goodness/badness 
judgments are acting as a manipulation check of the experimental manipulation, we should be 
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able to demonstrate that the goodness/badness judgments provide little to no causal information 
above and beyond the causal information provided by the effect of the experimental 
manipulation on intentionality judgments. This could be demonstrated by showing that the 
unique effect of goodness/badness judgments on intentionality judgments should be dramatically 
reduced when only the experimental manipulation is added to the model as a predictor of 
intentionality judgments. 
I predict that the statistical results will bear out the above empirical predictions. That is, I 
predict that the correlation between case and goodness/badness judgments will be strong and 
positive. Furthermore, I predict that the unique effect of goodness/badness judgments on 
intentionality judgments will be dramatically reduced when only the experimental manipulation 
is added to the model as a predictor of intentionality judgments.
5.2 Methods
The methods used here are the same as the methods mentioned in Section 4.2.
5.3 Results and Discussion*
In order to test the hypothesis that experimental manipulation is acting as a successful 
manipulation of goodness/badness judgments (and the observed variable goodness/badness 
judgments is an accurate measurement of this manipulation), a point-biserial correlation was 
computed. There was a strong, positive correlation between the experimental manipulation and 
goodness/badness judgments, rpb = .914, p < .001.
In order to test the hypothesis that goodness/badness judgments provide little to no causal 
information above and beyond the causal information provided by the experimental 
manipulation, a two-step hierarchical regression was conducted. In the first step, 
goodness/badness judgments was entered into the regression formula as the sole predictor of 
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intentionality judgments. In the second step, the experimental manipulation was added to the 
regression formula as a second predictor of intentionality judgments. The first step yielded the 
regression formula y = -.581x1 – 0, F(1, 297) = 213.380, p < .001, R
2 = .418. Goodness/badness 
judgments had a significant relationship with intentionality judgments such that, on average, the 
more one judged the side effect to be good, the less one judged the side effect to have been 
brought about intentionally,  = -.647, p < .001. The second step yielded the regression formula y
= -.196x1 – 2.093x2 + 1.036, F(2, 296) = 123.156, p < .001. The addition of the experimental 
manipulation to the model improved overall model fit, R2 = .036, p < .001. Goodness/badness 
judgments retained a significant effect on intentionality judgments in the same direction as the 
first step, but just marginally so,  = -.218, p = .041, rsp = -.088. For the purposes of the current 
hypothesis, it is important to notice that the unique effect of goodness/badness judgments, in 
standardized terms, dropped from  = -.647 to  = -.218 (and semi-partial correlations dropped 
from -.647 to -.088). Due to error, differences in scale, and other factors, one should not 
necessarily have expected that the inclusion of the experimental manipulation to decrease the 
unique effect of goodness/badness judgments on intentionality judgments to a nil effect. 
However, the fact that the experimental manipulation alone reduced the unique effect of 
goodness/badness judgments on intentionality judgments from a very large effect to a near-nil 
effect supports the hypothesis that the causal information provided by the goodness/badness 
judgments and the information provided by the experimental manipulation are, in large part, 
redundant. This in turn provides empirical support for the fact that the observed 
goodness/badness judgments variable is acting as nothing more than a manipulation check.
These results motivate the removal of the observed variable goodness/badness judgments
from an appropriately testable model (because the goodness/badness judgments variable and the 
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manipulation of case are redundant). Additionally, these issues motivate an interpretation of the 
effect of case on intentionality judgment that respects the fact the manipulation of case is a 
successful manipulation of goodness/badness judgments (because the manipulation of 
goodness/badness judgments is a constitutive part of the manipulation of case). In subsequent 
sections, when testing the predictions of the Deep Self Model, I will not include the observed 
variable goodness/badness judgments in any of the analysis. Additionally, the effect of the 
manipulation of case will be interpreted as a successful manipulation of goodness/badness 
judgments.
6 THE DEEP SELF MODEL IS STILL BIDIRECTIONAL
Despite the criticisms I have raised above, I think there is no denying the importance of 
deep-self judgments when making judgments of intentional action (and other folk psychological 
judgments). Often when making judgments of intentional action, we implicitly or explicitly ask 
ourselves: Is the agent the kind of person who would want to bring about such an outcome? 
Intuitions about this or similarly framed questions are then used as potential evidence that a
person acted intentionally. For example, returning to the story of Elijah and Sasha presented at 
the beginning of this paper, when the caregivers are trying to determine if Elijah intentionally 
knocked down Sasha, the caregivers may, explicitly or implicitly, consider what they perceive to 
be the values and attitudes or the behavioral dispositions of Elijah. For instance, if one of the 
caregivers believes that Elijah has a very negative attitude toward girls playing in his play space, 
or if one of the caregivers believes that Elijah is in general an aggressive child, then it is more 
likely that the caregiver will conclude that Elijah intentionally knocked down Sasha. 
However, it seems equally clear that the preponderance of evidence favors the conclusion 
that, in at least some cases, normative judgments are influencing judgments of intentional action 
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(and other folk psychological judgments). With this in mind, the best deep-self model of 
intentionality will be one that admits some degree of bidirectionality. 
One plausible way a bidirectional deep-self model could be cashed out would be in terms 
of claiming that deep-self judgments can attenuate (or, perhaps, also intensify) the effects of 
normative judgments on judgments of intentional action. Roughly, such a model would be 
committed to something along the following lines: In absence of other information, normative 
judgments often do impact judgments of intentional action (and perhaps other folk psychological 
judgments). Additionally, deep-self judgments also directly impact judgments of intentional 
action. However, the effect of normative judgments on judgments of intentional action will be 
attenuated, or will perhaps even disappear, to the extent that other judgments that provide 
information that conflict with the normative-driven attributions of intentional action are made.
Bringing this rough sketch to bear on the chairman case, the story might go as follows: 
People are predisposed to attribute greater intentionality when they judge that there has been a 
norm violation. The normative violation in the chairman case is the harming of the environment. 
Thus, there should be a predisposition to attribute greater intentionality when the chairman harms 
the environment than when the chairman helps the environment. However, this predisposition 
may be attenuated, or possibly even overridden, if people make deep-self judgments that stand in 
opposition to the norm-violation-driven intentionality attribution. So, for instance, if the people 
judged that the chairman was truly a lover of the environment, then the initial norm-violation-
driven effect may lessen, or perhaps even disappear. (I directly test this latter prediction in the 
next section.) 
In this section, my goal is to briefly review some specific predictions Sripada’s Deep Self 
Model is committed to. Then I want to compare these predictions to the predictions a 
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bidirectional deep-self model (like the one outlined above) might make. Then finally, I want to 
turn to testing these predictions, making the methodological corrections suggested by the 
discussion in Sections 4 and 5.
Several of the predictions of the Deep Self Model have already been rehearsed 
throughout the earlier sections of this paper. However, to get clear on the contrasting predictions 
that would be made by Sripada’s Deep Self Model and a bidirectional deep-self model, it may be 
helpful to review a couple key predictions. First, in the chairman case, the Deep Self Model 
makes a very explicit and specific prediction concerning the interaction of case and chairman 
values/attitudes judgments on intentionality judgments. The Deep Self Model predicts that to the 
extent that people attribute anti-environmental attitudes to the chairman, intentionality judgments 
will be higher in the cases where the chairman harms the environment (and lower in cases where 
the chairman helps the environment), but also, to the extent that people attribute pro-
environmental attitudes to the chairman, intentionality judgments will be higher in cases where 
the chairman helps the environment (and lower in cases where the chairman harms the 
environment). This prediction entails a “crossover” effect in which the interaction crosses over at 
the point in which people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes (i.e., environmental 
attitudes that are neither anti- nor pro-environmental) to the chairman. In other words, when 
people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes to the chairman, there should be no effect of 
case on intentionality judgments. Second, the Deep Self Model predicts that once the effect of 
the deep-self variables on intentionality judgments is accounted for, there should be no effect, 
neither direct nor indirect, of normative variables on intentionality judgments above and beyond 
the effects of deep self variables. This prediction reinforces the precision of the prediction that 
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when people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes, there will be no effect of case on 
intentionality judgments. 
These predictions of Sripada’s Deep Self Model can be graphically represented by a 
pattern of simple slopes. Simple slopes represent the relationship of an independent variable with 
a dependent variable at different levels of a moderating variable. In our case, the simple slopes 
would be used to represent the relationship of the manipulation of case with intentionality 
judgments at different levels of chairman values/attitudes judgments. Given the coding scheme 
used in the experiment, Sripada and Konrath’s model would predict a negative slope when anti-
environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman, no slope (i.e., a line with a slope of 0) 
when ambivalent environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman, and a positive slope 
when pro-environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman. See Figure 5 for the simple 
slope pattern predicted by Sripada’s Deep Self Model.
A bidirectional deep-self model would make a very similar pattern of predictions. 
However, since a bidirectional deep-self model allows that normative judgments can have an 
effect on intentionality judgments above and beyond the effect of deep-self judgments, a 
bidirectional deep-self model would allow that, when ambivalent environmental attitudes are 
attributed to the chairman, intentionality judgments may remain higher in the harm case than the 
help case. Implied by this claim is that, under a bidirectional deep-self model, the crossover 
effect, if there is a crossover effect, may occur at some point in which people attribute pro-
environmental attitudes to the chairman. If the strength of the effect of normative variables above 
and beyond the effect of the deep-self variables on intentionality judgments is strong, then the 
crossover would occur when the attributions of pro-environmental values and attitudes are high 
(or the crossover may not occur at all if the effect of the normative variables is strong enough). If 
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Figure 5. The Deep Self Model predicted simple slopes of intentionality judgments regressed on 
case at different levels of chairman values/attitudes judgments controlling for all the other 
variables in the model.
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the strength of the effect of normative variables above and beyond the effect of the deep-self 
variables on intentionality judgments is weak, then the crossover would occur when the 
attributions of pro-environmental values and attitudes are low (but still on the pro-environmental 
side). If there is no effect of normative variables above and beyond the effect of deep-self 
variables on intentionality judgments, then the crossover would occur when ambivalent attitudes 
are attributed to the chairman (this is the prediction of Sripada’s Deep Self Model).
To test these competing predictions, I will examine the exact nature of the case by 
chairman values/attitudes judgment moderation effect. That is, I will examine the relationship 
between case and intentionality judgments at various levels of chairman values/attitudes 
judgments. I predict that the results that will contrast with what should be predicted by Sripada’s 
Deep Self Model, but will be consistent with the results predicted by a bidirectional deep-self 
model. More specifically, I predict that when people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes 
to the chairman, people will be more likely to attribute intentionality to the chairman in the harm 
case than in the help case. Additionally, since the bidirectional deep-self model I have in mind 
predicts that the effect of normative judgments on intentionality judgments should not be 
attenuated in the chairman case, I also predict that, even as the attribution of pro-environmental 
attitudes to the chairman begin to become relatively strong, people will remain more likely to 
attribute intentionality to the chairman in the harm case than in the help case. Before continuing 
to the results, it should be kept in mind that the prediction that people will remain more likely to 
attribute intentionality to the chairman in the harm case than the help case when people attribute 
ambivalent environmental attitudes to the chairman is enough to provide a sufficient challenge to 
Sripada’s Deep Self Model, as his model strictly implies that there should be no difference of 
intentionality attributions between the harm and help case when ambivalent environmental 
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attitudes are attributed. The second prediction concerning the pattern of intentionality attributions 
when people attribute pro-environmental attitudes to the chairman, if correct, will help make an 
even stronger case against Sripada’s Deep Self Model, along with providing some initial 
plausibility for the type of bidirectional deep-self model outlined above.
6.2 Methods
The methods used here are the same as the methods mentioned in Section 4.2.
6.3 Results and Discussion*
See Table 3 for the descriptive statistics for intentionality judgments and chairman 
values/attitudes judgments.
In order to test the nature of the interaction effect of case and chairman values/attitudes 
judgments on intentionality judgments, a two-step hierarchical regression was conducted. In the 
first step, case (x1) and chairman values/attitudes judgments (x2) were entered as a predictor of 
intentionality judgments (y). Additionally, due to their theoretical importance for other models 
and in an effort to test the interaction effect in a manner that would be maximally consistent with 
Sripada and Konrath’s model, behavioral generalization judgments (x3) and moral status 
judgments (x4) were included in the model. In an effort to facilitate accurate and meaningful 
interpretations, the variables chairman values/attitudes judgments, behavioral generalization 
judgments, and moral status judgments were all mean-centered (Cronbach, 1987). In the second
step of the hierarchical regression, the interaction term case x (mean-centered) chairman 
values/attitudes judgments (x5) was entered into the model as a moderator. The first step yielded 
the regression formula -2.573x1 – .116x2 + .118x3 – .080x4, F(4, 294) = 62.629, p < .001, R
2 = 
.460. The second step yielded the regression formula, -2.638x1 – .438x2 + .098x3 – .058x4 + 
.616x5, F(5, 293) = 56.256, p < .001. The addition of the moderator improved overall model fit,
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Table 3. Means for intentionality judgments and chairman values/attitudes judgments
Harm Condition Help Condition
Intentionality Judgments 4.93 (SD = 1.88) 1.95 (SD = 1.41)
Chairman Values/Attitudes 
Judgments
2.58 (SD = 1.24) 2.82 (SD = 1.28)
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R2 = .030, p < .001, providing evidence of a significant moderation effect. 
With the finding of the moderation effect, the next step is to test and plot simple slopes in 
order to get a better feel for the nature of the interaction effect (Aiken & West, 1991; Frazier, et 
al., 2004). In order to test the predictions of each model, I tested and plotted the simple slopes 
that represent the effect of case on intentionality judgments at different levels of chairman 
values/attitudes judgments. Specifically, I examined the effect of case on intentionality 
judgments at some value for which anti-environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman, at 
some value for which ambivalent environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman, and at 
some value for which pro-environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman. Given that the 
average chairman values/attitudes judgments were anti-environmental (M = 2.70), I used average 
chairman values/attitudes judgments as the value chosen for anti-environmental. This choice may 
seem fairly arbitrary, but the exact value chosen for this slope really does not matter too much 
because neither model makes different predictions in the chairman cases when people attribute 
anti-environmental attitudes to the chairman.
Since the mid-point 4 on the 7-point scale used to measure chairman values/attitudes 
judgments represents neither pro-environmental nor anti-environmental, I used a rating of 4 as 
the value chosen for the attribution of ambivalent environmental attitudes. 
For pro-environmental attitudes, I used the value 5.30. This choice was drive by two 
factors: a trivial, aesthetic reason and a substantive reason. The trivial reason why this value was 
chosen was because the chosen anti-environmental value was 1.30 units below the mid-point and 
the value of 5.30 is symmetrically 1.30 units above the midpoint. The substantive reason why 
5.30 was chosen was because this value also represents attributions of moderately strong pro-
environmental attitudes. Thus, this value allows us to test our second prediction, namely, that 
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people will remain more inclined to attribute intentionality in the harm case than in the help case 
even when people attribute moderately pro-environmental attitudes.
The tests reveal that when people attribute anti-environmental attitudes to the chairman, 
they are more inclined to attribute intentionality to the chairman in the harm case than in the help 
case, B = -2.638, p < .001, rsp = -.491. Both models would predict this effect. 
When people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes to the chairman, they remain 
more inclined to attribute intentionality to the chairman in the harm case than in the help case, 
though to a slightly lesser degree than when they attribute anti-environmental attitudes to the 
chairman, B = -1.838, p < .001, rsp = -.235.
10 This result is inconsistent with Sripada’s Deep Self 
Model, as his model predicts no difference of intentionality judgments between cases when 
people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes to the chairman. However, this result is 
perfectly consistent with a bidirectional deep-self model.
When people attribute pro-environmental attitudes to the chairman, they again remain 
more inclined to attribute intentionality to the chairman in the harm case than in the help case, 
though to a slightly lesser degree than when they attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes 
toward him, B -1.037, p = .025, rsp = -.130. This result is clearly very problematic for Sripada’s 
Deep Self Model, as his model predicts that when people attribute pro-environmental attitudes to 
the chairman, they should be more likely to attribute intentionality in the help case than in the 
harm case. However, this result are fully consistent with a bidirectional deep-self model that 
                                                
10 If for whatever reason one is not satisfied with the value of 5.40 being used to test the slope for 
the attributions pro-environmental attitudes and may want an even more pro-environmental 
value, I also tested the simple slope at a value of 6, which was the most pro-environmental rating 
any participant gave the chairman. Even when testing the slope using a value of 6, people 
remained more inclined to attribute intentionality in the harm case than in the help case.
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holds that deep-self variables can attenuate (or intensify) the effects of normative variables on 
intentionality judgments. See Figure 6 for the simple slope pattern that was actually obtained.
7 THE CASE OF THE CARING CHAIRMAN
Almost all of the research on the side-effect effect has involved vignettes in which the 
actor expresses “not caring” about bringing about some outcome—an outcome that is meant to
be recognized as a foreseeable side effect of some desired plan of action. The repeated use of the 
expression of indifference throughout the literature is understandable, as the expressed 
indifference serves as a cue that the relevant outcome is a side effect. However, being indifferent 
toward a foreseen outcome is not necessary for recognizing that an outcome is a side effect. Take 
for an example a patient who is planning to take prescription painkillers for extreme muscle 
soreness. Imagine the patient goes to the pharmacy to pick up her prescription, and the 
pharmacist informs her that the medicine will probably make her drowsy, so she should not drive 
or operate heavy machinery after taking the medicine. To this information, it seems perfectly 
natural for the patient to respond, “I am actually happy that a side effect of me taking this 
medicine is that the medicine might make me drowsy. I could definitely use the extra sleep.” 
Here there is nothing inconsistent about the patient welcoming a side effect of her action’s 
intended goal.
Furthermore, in the side-effect effect cases, the most likely cue through which the 
expressed indifference is meant to reinforce the idea that the relevant outcome is a side effect is 
through a failure to attribute to the actor desires to bring about the outcome. However, in 
Knobe’s original chairman cases, people do tend to attribute a desire to harm the environment in 
the case where the chairman does harm the environment (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010). So, not 
only is an expression of indifference not necessary for a foreseeable outcome to be rightfully 
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Figure 6. The observed simple slopes of intentionality judgments regressed on case at different 
levels of chairman values/attitudes judgments controlling for all the other variables in the model.
Note: All simple slopes were statistically significant ps < .05. 
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considered a side effect, but the most likely cue through which expressed indifference might act 
to reinforce the idea that the relevant outcome is a side effect fails to occur in Knobe’s chairman 
case. 
These facts open up the potential to explore the side-effect effect with caring actors. 
Including manipulations that vary on a dimension of expressed concern could possibly shed 
more light on the current debate, as these types of manipulations could be used to experimentally 
manipulate the values and attitudes attributed to the actor. With this in mind, I would like to 
introduce the case of the caring chairman. The caring, harm case reads as follows:
The vice president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We 
are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will 
also harm the environment.”
The chairman of the board answered, “I have always been – and still am – deeply 
concerned about the environment. Our company is also facing bankruptcy. We 
must do something. With great regret, I say, ‘let’s start the new program.’”
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.
The caring, help case reads as follows:
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The vice president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We 
are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will 
also help the environment.”
The chairman of the board answered, “I have always been – and still am – deeply 
concerned about the environment. Our company is also facing bankruptcy. We 
must do something. With great satisfaction, I say, ‘Let’s start the new program.’”
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.
The predictions of Sripada’s Deep Self Model should apply invariantly across 
manipulations of concern. That is, the model should again predict that to the extent that people 
attribute anti-environmental attitudes to the chairman, intentionality judgments will be higher in 
the cases where the chairman harms the environment (and lower in cases where the chairman 
helps the environment), but also, to the extent that people attribute pro-environmental attitudes to 
the chairman, intentionality judgments will be higher in cases where the chairman helps the 
environment (and lower in cases where the chairman harms the environment). Again, these 
predictions imply a crossover effect in which, at the point of indifference, there should be no 
effect of case on intentionality judgments. 
On the other hand, if normative variables are having an effect above and beyond the 
effect of the deep-self variables, people should remain more likely to attribute intentionality in 
the harm case than the help case when they attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes to the 
chairman. Thus, if normative variables are having an effect above and beyond the effect of the 
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deep-self variables, any crossover effect, if there is a crossover effect, will occur at some point in 
which people attribute pro-environmental attitudes to the chairman. If the strength of the effect 
of normative judgments above and beyond the effect of the deep-self judgments on intentionality 
judgments is strong, then the crossover would occur when the attributions of pro-environmental 
values and attitudes are high (or the crossover may not occur at all if the effect of the normative 
variables is strong enough). If the strength of the effect of normative judgments above and 
beyond the effect of the deep-self variables on intentionality judgments is low, then the crossover 
would occur when the attributions of pro-environmental values and attitudes are low (but still on 
the pro-environmental side). If there are no effects of normative judgments above and beyond the 
effect of deep-self variables on intentionality judgments, then the crossover would occur when 
ambivalent attitudes are attributed to the chairman (this is the prediction of Sripada’s Deep Self 
Model).
Again, the type of bidirectional deep-self model I outlined in Section 6 is committed to a 
specific prediction concerning the strength of the effect of the normative judgments on 
intentionality judgments above and beyond the effect of the deep-self variables. Since, in the 
caring chairman case, the chairman expresses great concern about the environment, the deep-self 
attributions should conflict with the norm violation of harming the environment. Thus, according 
to the type of bidirectional deep-self model outlined in Section 6, the predisposition to attribute 
greater intentionality in the harm case than in the help case should be attenuated, if not 
overridden, by the information provided by the deep-self judgments. This implies that, in the 
caring chairman case, the effect of normative variables on intentionality judgments above 
beyond the effect of deep-self variables will be weak at best. This further translates into the 
55
specific claim that the crossover effect should occur when the attributions of environmental 
attitudes to the chairman are near ambivalence.
Given the specific predictions made by the type of bidirectional deep-self model I 
outlined in Section 6, the caring chairman case should be able to provide a good test of this 
model. The caring chairman case also provides the potential for another opportunity to test 
Sripada’s Deep Self Model. However, it should be noted that the attenuation prediction of the 
bidirectional deep-self model predicts that, in the caring chairman case, the results should look 
approximately like the results that would be predicted by Sripada’s Deep Self Model. It is in this 
sense that the caring chairman case only provides the potential for another opportunity to test 
Sripada’s Deep Self Model. 
To test the predictions of the two models, I will examine the exact nature of the case x
chairman values/attitudes judgment moderation effect. Given that the deep-self attributions 
conflict with the norm violation, I predict that there will not be a difference of intentionality 
judgments between the harm and help cases when the attributions of environmental attitudes to 
the chairman are slightly pro-environmental (but still near ambivalence). This prediction assumes 
that the deep-self judgments do not provide quite enough conflicting information to completely 
override the effect of normative judgments on intentionality judgments; rather the conflicting 
information simply attenuates the effect of intentionality judgments. If this exact prediction is 
correct, this implies that, when people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes to the 
chairman, they should be more likely to attribute intentionality in the harm case than the help 
case. If this prediction is correct, this would again provide evidence against Sripada’s Deep Self 
Model, as his model strictly implies that there should be no difference of intentionality 
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attributions between the harm and help case when ambivalent environmental attitudes are 
attributed.
7.2 Methods
The methods used here are the same methods mentioned in Section 4.2, except that the 
two vignettes used here were the caring chairman vignettes (n = 252) (see Section 7 for full 
description of these vignettes).
7.3 Results and Discussion*
See Table 4 for the descriptive statistics for intentionality judgments and chairman 
values/attitudes judgments.
In order to test the nature of the interaction effect of case and chairman values/attitudes 
judgments on intentionality judgments, a two-step hierarchical regression was conducted. In the 
first step, case (x1) and chairman values/attitudes judgments (x2) were entered as a predictor of 
intentionality judgments (y). Again, behavioral generalization judgments (x3) and moral status
judgments (x4) were included in the model as covariates. In an effort to facilitate accurate and 
meaningful interpretations, the variables chairman values/attitudes judgments, behavioral 
generalization judgments, and moral status judgments were all mean-centered. In the second step 
of the hierarchical regression, the interaction term case by (mean-centered) chairman 
values/attitudes judgments (x5) was entered into the model as a moderator. The first step yielded 
the regression formula -.207x1 + .137x2 + .301x3 + .025x4, F(4, 247) = 5.805, p < .001, R
2 = .086. 
The second step yielded the regression formula, -.338x1 – .174x2 + .192x3 + .023x4 + .852x5, F(5, 
246) = 8.952, p < .001. The addition of the moderator improved overall model fit, R2 = .068, p
< .001, providing evidence of a significant interaction effect.
In order to test the predictions of each model, I tested and plotted simple slopes that 
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Table 4. Means for intentionality judgments and chairman values/attitudes judgments in the 
caring chairman case
Harm Condition Help Condition
Intentionality Judgments 4.32 (SD = 1.94) 4.41 (SD = 1.65)
Chairman Values/Attitudes 
Judgments
4.02 (SD = 1.32) 5.36 (SD = 1.07)
58
represent the effect of case on intentionality judgments at some value for which anti-
environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman, at some value for which ambivalent 
environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman, and at some value for which pro-
environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman. For the pro-environmental value, I used 
the value 4.69. This choice was drive by two factors: a semi-trivial reason and a substantive 
reason. The semi-trivial reason why this value was chosen was because this was the value of the 
mean chairman values/attitudes judgments, and this mean fell on the pro-environmental attitude 
side. The substantive reason why 4.69 was chosen was because this value represents attributions 
of environmental attitudes that are slightly pro-environmental. Thus, this value allows us to 
provide a test of the prediction that there will not be a difference of intentionality judgments 
between the harm and help cases when the attributions of environmental attitudes to the 
chairman are slightly pro-environmental. 
The mid-point 4 on the 7- point scale used to measure chairman values/attitudes 
judgments represents neither pro-environmental nor anti-environmental, so I used a rating of 4 
as the value chosen for the attribution of ambivalent environmental attitudes. For anti-
environmental attitudes, I used the value 3.31. This value was chosen because the chosen pro-
environmental value was .69 units above the mid-point and the value of 3.31 is symmetrically 
.69 units below the midpoint. This value may seem like a completely arbitrary choice, but the 
exact value chosen for this slope really does not matter too much because neither model makes 
different predictions in the chairman cases when people attribute anti-environmental attitudes to 
the chairman.
The tests reveal that when people attribute pro-environmental attitudes to the chairman, 
there is no evidence that intentionality attributions differ by case, B = -.338, p = .20, rsp = -.075. 
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At first glance, this result appears to support the predictions made by the type of bidirectinal 
deep-self model outlined in Section 6, while also providing some evidence against Sripada’s 
Deep Self Model. However, it may be claimed that this result is somewhat ambiguous as to 
whether it should count as evidence for or against either model. A proponent of the Deep Self 
Model may want to claim that a value of 4.69 is close enough to the mid-point that it should be 
interpreted as an attribution of ambivalent environmental attitudes.  
When people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes to the chairman, they are more 
likely to attribute intentionality to the chairman in the harm case than in the help case, B = -926, 
p = .003, rsp = -.177. This result is a bit less ambiguous, disfavoring Sripada’s Deep Self Model, 
as his model predicts that when people attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes to the 
chairman, there should be no effect of case. Sripada’s model predicts that attributions of 
intentionality will be more likely in the harm case than the help case only when anti-
environmental attitudes are attributed to the chairman. Whereas, at the tested pro-environmental 
level, a proponent of the Deep Self Model could argue that the chosen value is so close to 
ambivalence that, for the purposes of testing their model, it should be treated as ambivalence, 
there does not appear to be an available response by the proponent of the Deep Self Model to 
claim that the tested ambivalent level should be taken to be representative of anti-environmental 
attitudes. On the other hand, this result is consistent with a bidirectional deep-self model, and is 
fact predicted by the type of bidirectional deep-self model outlined in Section 6.
When people attribute anti-environmental attitudes to the chairman, they remain more 
inclined to attribute intentionality to the chairman in the harm case than in the help case, and to 
an even greater degree than when they attribute ambivalent environmental attitudes toward him, 
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B -1.514, p < .001, rsp = -.226. Both models would predict this result. See Figure 7 for the simple 
slope pattern obtained for the caring chairman cases.
Taken together, the results of the original chairman case and the caring chairman case, if 
correct, provide strong evidence against Sripada’s Deep Self Model, while providing evidence 
for a bidirectional deep-self model (along with providing initial plausibility for a bidirectional 
deep-self model, like the one I outlined in Section 6).
The original chairman cases provided fairly strong evidence against Sripada’s Deep Self 
Model, as the model’s predictions concerning the relationships between case and intentionality 
judgments were clearly contradicted when ambivalent attitudes were attributed to the chairman 
and also when moderately strong pro-environmental attitudes were attributed to the chairman. I 
would also argue that the caring chairman case provided additional evidence against Sripada's 
Deep Self Model, as the model’s predictions concerning the relationship between case and 
intentionality judgments were not upheld when ambivalent attitudes were attributed to the 
chairman, and arguably, when slightly pro-environmental attitudes were attributed to the 
chairman. However, a proponent of Sripada’s Deep Self Model may want to lean on the claim 
that the Deep Self Model can allow some minimal role for normative variables while legitimately 
remaining a unidirectional model. After all, there is probably some minimal level of influence at 
which one could legitimately claim that the influence was irrelevantly small. However, even if I 
were to make this concession to the proponent of the Deep Self Model, the results based on the 
original chairman case reported in this paper provide strong evidence that normative factors are 
playing a large role in the original Knobe case. This result, if correct, is without a doubt 
problematic for the Deep Self Model. After all, his model was explicitly designed to be able to 
handle this very case.
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Figure 7. The observed simple slopes of intentionality judgments regressed on case at different 
levels of chairman values/attitudes judgments controlling for all the other variables in the model 
for the caring chairman cases.
Note: Simple slopes for anti-environmental attitudes and ambivalent environmental attitudes 
were significant, ps < .05.
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On the other hand, both the results of the original chairman cases and the results of the 
caring chairman cases provided confirmatory evidence for the type of bidirectional model 
outlined in Section 6. In the original chairman case, since the deep-self judgments do not conflict 
with the attribution of intentionality in the norm violating case, the effect of normative 
judgments on intentionality judgments above and beyond the effects of the deep-self variables 
were strong. The claim that normative judgments have an effect on judgments of intentional 
action was evidenced by the fact that people were more likely to attribute intentionality in the 
harm case than in the help case even when ambivalent attitudes were attributed to the chairman. 
The claim that the effect of normative judgments on judgments of intentional action was strong 
was evidenced by the fact that people remained more likely to attribute intentionality in the harm 
case than in the help case even when moderately strong pro-environmental attitudes were 
attributed to the chairman. In the caring chairman case, since the deep-self judgments do conflict 
with the attribution of intentionality in the norm violating case, the effect of normative 
judgments on judgments of intentional action were weak (but still present). Again, the claim that 
normative judgments have an effect on judgments of intentional action was evidenced by the fact 
that people were more likely to attribute intentionality in the harm case than in the help case even 
when ambivalent attitudes were attributed to the chairman. The claim that the effect of normative 
judgments on judgments of intentional action was weak was evidenced by the fact that there was 
no effect of case when slightly pro-environmental attitudes were attributed to the chairman. All 
of these predictions are exactly the predictions the type of bidirectional model I outlined in 
Section 6 would predict.
The combination of all these results suggest that normative judgments do in fact have an 
effect on judgments of intentional action, at least some cases. Going forward, I think the debate 
63
concerning the role of normative judgments when making judgments of intentional action would 
best be served, not by debating whether or not normative judgments play a role in the production 
of judgments of intentional action, but rather by trying to figure out in what context and to what 
extent normative judgments play a role in the production of judgments of intentional action. In 
the process of trying to convince the reader that normative judgments are having an effect on 
judgments of intentional action above and beyond the effects of deep-self judgments, I have 
provided a rough outline of a model that attempts to give an account of the context and the extent 
that normative judgments play a role in the production of judgments of intentional action. One 
potential project going forward may be trying to fill in more details of this (or some similar) 
model and rigorously test the commitments of the model.
8. A DISAPPEARING ACT?
It is my hope that as we come to the end of this thesis the reader has become convinced—
or at least moved to accept—that, even though deep-self-type judgments may play an important 
role in folk judgments of intentional action, there seems to be no denying the fact that normative 
judgments retain a significant influence on folk judgments of intentional action, above and 
beyond the influence of deep-self-type judgments, at least in some contexts. A plausible 
bidirectional account of the data—both in terms of accounting for the data presented here and the 
data that has been amassed throughout the literature—might be one that admits that deep-self-
type judgments are judgments that can attenuate (or, perhaps intensify) the effect of normative 
judgments on judgments of intentional action. 
If these main points are (roughly) correct, then there are some consequences for the 
philosophically relevant debates I raised in the introduction of this paper. The first general 
conclusion that can be drawn from the arguments and evidence presented in this paper is that the 
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debates mentioned in the introduction of this paper are simply not going to disappear. More to 
the point, these debates will retain the content of the “bidirectional problem.” Remember, one of 
the advantages of a unidirectional model is that, if a unidirectional model is true, then the puzzles 
associated with bidirectionalism disappear. So, for instance, if unidirectionalism is right, 
conservatives—that is, philosophers who think philosophical accounts of various concepts are 
constrained by folk belief and application—no longer have to wrestle the uneasy choice of either 
(a) admitting that a philosophically appropriate account of intentional action must account for the 
influence of normative judgments on intentional action, (b) convincingly argue that the folk are 
pervasively and systematically confused when they allow normative judgments to influence their 
judgments of intentional action and then further provide some kind of error theory that would 
allow the conservative to remain conservative while rejecting the folk’s application of intentional 
action when these applications are (wrongly) influenced by normative judgments, or (c) rejecting 
conservatism when it comes to the influence of normative judgments on judgments of intentional 
action. Similarly, if unidirectionalism is correct, those who wish to argue that folk psychology 
has a fundamentally normative component that is completely independent of explanation and 
prediction would lose their ability to lean on bidirectional(-seeming) results. In particular, if 
unidirectionalism is correct, this fact would be devastating to Knobe’s argument for the claim 
that folk psychology has a fundamentally normative component, as the primary motivating 
premise for his argument relies heavily on bidirectional-seeming results actually being 
bidirectional. Additionally, if unidirectionalism is correct, the concern that bidirectionality calls 
into question whether judgments of intentional action can function as the sorts of judgments that 
can, independently and impartially, guide judgments of responsibility (or wrongness of act or 
etc.) would no longer be a problem. However, if the arguments and evidence presented in the 
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paper are (roughly) correct, then these problems do not go away. Bidirectionalism is here to stay, 
as are the potential problems that bidirectionalism raises.
66
REFERENCES
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Alicke, M. (2008). Blaming Badly. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 1-2(8), 179-186.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical considerations. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
Buckwalter, W. & Beebe, J. (2010). The epistemic side-effect effect. Mind and Language, 25
(4), 474-498.
Churchland, Paul. (1989). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior.
Philosophical Perspectives, 3, 225-241.
Cronbach, L. (1987). Statistical Tests for Moderator Variables: Flaws in Analyses Recently
Proposed. Quantitative Methods in Psychology, 102(3), 414-417. 
Doris, J., Knobe, J., Woolfolk, R. (2007). Variantism about responsibility. Philosophical
Perspectives, 21, 183-214.
Frazier, P., Tix, A., & Barron, K. (2004) Testing Moderator and Mediator Effects in Counseling
Psychology Research. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 51(1), 115-134.
Goldman, A (1989) Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language, 4, 104-119.
Gopnik, A. & Meltzoff, A. (1997). Words, Thoughts and Theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gordon, R. (1986) Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language, 1, 158-171.
Hitchcock, C. & Knobe, J. (2009). Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy, 106 (11), 587-612. 
Hoyle, R. H., & Kenny, D. A. (1999). Statistical power and tests of mediation. In R. H. Hoyle
(Ed.), Statistical strategies for small sample research. Newbury Park: Sage.
67
Knobe, J. (2003a). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis, 63, 190
193.
Knobe, J. (2003b). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation.
Philosophical Psychology, 16, 309-324.  
Knobe, J. (2004). Intention, intentional action, and moral considerations. Analysis, 64, 181-187.
Knobe, J. (2005). Theory of mind and moral cognition: Exploring the connections. Trends in
Cognitive Science, 9, 357-359.
Knobe, J. (2006). The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology.
Philosophical Studies, 130, 203-231
Knobe, J. (2010). Person as a moralists account and its alternative. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences.
Knobe, J. & Burra, A. (2006). Intentional and Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study.
Journal of Culture and Cognition, 6, 113-132.
Knobe, J. & Fraser, B. (2008). Causal judgment and moral judgment: Two experiments. In W.
Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 441-448.
Knobe, J. & Roedder, E. (2009). The ordinary concept of valuing. Philsophical Issues, 19 (1),
131-147.
Leslie, A., Knobe, J. & Cohen, A. (2006). Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: Theory
of mind and moral judgment. Psychological Science, 17, 421-427.
Mallon, R. (2008). Knobe vs. Machery: Testing the trade-off hypothesis. Mind and Language,
23, 247-255.
68
Mele, A. (2001). Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions. In B. Malle, L. Moses, & D.
Baldwin (Eds), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 27-44.
Mele, A. (2006). The folk concept of intentional action: A commentary. Journal of Cognition
and Culture, 6, 277-290.
Nadelhoffer, T. (2004a) Praise, side effects, and intentional action. Journal of Theoretical and
Philosophical Psychology, 24, 196-213.
Nadelhoffer, T. (2004b). The Butler problem revisited. Analysis, 64, 277-284.
Nadelhoffer, T. (2006). Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions.
Nado, J. 2008: Effects of moral cognition on judgments of intentionality. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 59, 709-731.
Nadelhoffer, T. (2006). Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions: Some problems
for juror impartiality, Philosophical Explorations, 9(2), 203-219.
Nisbett, R. and Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental
processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231-259.
Pettit, D. and Knobe, J. (2009). The pervasive impact of moral judgment. Mind and Language,
24 (5), 586-604.
Pizarro, D & Tannenbaum, D. (forthcoming). Bringing character back: How the motivation to
evaluate character influences judgments of moral blame. For inclusion in M. Mikulincer
& Shaver, P. (Eds) The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good
and Evil. APA Press.
Rose, D., Livengood, J., Sytsma, J., Machery, E. (manuscript). Deep Trouble for the Deep Self.
Carnegie Mellon University.
69
Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies:
New procedures and recommendations. Psychological Methods, 7, 422-445.
Sigall, H. & Mills, J. (1998). Measures of independent variables and mediators are useful in
social psychology experiments: But are they necessary?. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 2(3), 218-226.
Sripada, C. (2010). The Deep Self Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about
intentional action. Philosophical Studies, 151(2), 159-176.
Sripada, C. & Konrath, S. (forthcomingb). Telling more than we can know about intentional
action. Mind & Language.
Ulatowski, J. (manuscript). Action under a description. Unpublished manuscript. University of
Neveda Las Vegas.
Uttich, K. & Lombrozo, T. (2010). Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation
for the side-effect effect. Cognition, 116, 87-100.
Williams, E. J. (1949): Experimental designs balanced for the estimation of residual effects of
treatments. Australian Journal of Scientific Research, Ser. A 2, 149-168.
Wright, J.C. & Bengson, J. (2009) Asymmetries in judgments of responsibility and intentional
action. Mind & Language, 24, 24-50.
Young, L., Cushman, F., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Hauser, M. (2006). Does emotion mediate
the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status?
Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6, 291-304.
